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THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978:
DISCHARGEABILITY OF OBLIGATIONS INCURRED
UNDER PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS,
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS, AND
DIVORCE DECREES
«It is the underlying policy of the Bankruptcy Act to give the
bankrupt a fresh start and to relieve him 0/pre-existing debts.
In many instances the determination of what is alimony, {maintenance, and support} comes into direct cOl!flict with this policy. "1 Under the Act these debts are nondischargeable. Thus,
in an attempt to construe the Act narrowly and uphold the underlying p07icy offresh start, courts are faced with the problem
of determining how to characterize marital obligations.
I.

INTRODUCTION
On October 1, 1979 the Federal Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
(the Code) became effective. Section 523(a)(5) of the Code provides
that any debt owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor
for alimony, maintenance, or support be nondischargeable. 2 This section continues the historical approach of protecting spouses or children
from future adversities which they may face when the family unit is
destroyed. Hence, section 523(a)(5) codifies the belief that upon divorce
the former spouse, rather than society, should be responsible for the
maintenance and support of the economically dependent spouse and
child. Family support obligations have traditionally been considered a
duty, not a debt, and therefore are deemed more important than the
debtor's fresh start.
Under the Code, however, an equitable division of property is a
dischargeable debt. Consequently, most of the litigation that arises
under section 523(a)(5) requires the court to interpret property settlements and separation agreements to determine whether they represent
alimony, support, maintenance, or an equitable division of property.
This comment discusses and compares the law as it existed under
the prior Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act) with the law as it presently
exists under the Code. The primary focus is on the problems courts face
in interpreting property settlements, separation agreements, and divorce decrees to determine the dischargeability of a debtor's debts. The
problem arises because in making this determination courts must balance the policy of giving the debtor a fresh start against that of requiring the debtor to satisfy his marital obligations. Alimony is clearly
nondischargeable; however, third party debts are dischargeable and
consequently courts are faced with the problem of determining the nature of the debts in order to determine discharge ability.
1. In re Bomer, Bankruptcy No. W-122-73 (S.D. Iowa, Oct. 30, 1973).
2. See II U.S.c. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981).
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The pivotal issue relevant to the discharge of marital debts in
bankruptcy is whether an award in a divorce decree constitutes a grant
of alimony or a division of property. Although the designation of
property settlement or alimony in a divorce agreement is not conclusive
it may be regarded as persuasive. 3 Hence, a brief discussion of the
methods used by courts to determine the nature of awards in divorce
settlements is warranted.
1.

Alimony, Support, and Maintenance

At common law, courts found the justification for alimony, support, and maintenance in the general duty imposed upon the husband
to support his wife and child.4 Consequently, courts considered
spousal obligations to be nondischargeable duties as opposed to dischargeable debts.s The United States Supreme Court explained this
rationale when it noted that "the Bankruptcy law should . . . [not) deprive dependent wife and children of the support and maintenance due
them from the husband and father, which it has ever been the purpose
of the law to enforce."6
The problem arises, however, in that neither the Bankruptcy Act
of 1898 nor the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 include a definition of
the term alimony.7 Consequently, a frequently litigated issue under the
original Act and the Code involves the determination of exactly what
constitutes alimony, support, and maintenance. In the early cases,
courts viewed alimony as an allowance by which a husband paid for
his wife's maintenance, as well as for the support of his minor children. s These courts automatically presumed the existence of a duty of
spousal support that generally terminated upon the dependent spouse's
remarriage or the supporting spouse's death. 9 Courts today adopt this
3. Martin v. Henley, 452 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Avery, 114 F.2d 768 (6th Cir.
1940). One reason the designation is only persuasive is because many state courts
assimilate the property division into the alimony decree, taking into account the
same factors which are relevant in setting alimony when they are, in fact, dividing
property. Thus, the courts have come to blur the distinction between alimony
orders and divisions of property. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8 (West 1968).
4. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575
(1901); Turner v. Turner, 108 F. 785 (D. Ind. 1901); In re Shepard, 97 F. 187
(D.N.Y. 1899).
5. See cases cited supra note 4.
6. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
7. See 11 U.S.c. § 35 (1976) (Bankruptcy Act of 1898); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp.
V 1981) (Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978).
8. Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1956); see also Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928); Westmoreland v. Dodd, 2 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.), cerl. denied, 267 U.S. 595 (1924).
9. See cases cited supra note 8.
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same definition of alimony. 10 However, instead of automatically
presuming a duty of support between the spouses, modem courts impose alimony only upon a finding based on relative need, the length of
the marriage, and the presence of minor children. II
2.

Property

Debts are considered dischargeable in bankruptcy if the court determines that they arise out of a division of marital property. 12 Whereas
the primary purpose of alimony is to support the wife and children, the
function of a property settlement is to divide what is considered property owned by each spouse. 13 Such a settlement is usually based on the
equities that exist between the parties at the time of the divorce, 14
rather than on the wife's needs and the husband's income. IS Since the
rights of the parties in a property settlement are determined according
to the law of contracts, I the agreement will remain in effect despite
remarriage or changed financial conditions. 17 Hence, courts generally
view an obligation which does not terminate upon death or remarriage
of the spouse and does not aPEear to relate to living expenses as indicative of a property settlement. 8
B.

Cases Decided Prior to the Enactment of the 1978 Code

As originally enacted, the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 did not specifically except alimony or support obligations from the discharge of
debts.19 Rather, a debt had to be provable in order for it to be discharged. 20 Under section 63 of the original Act, a provable debt was a
fixed liability evidenced by a judgment or instrument in writing.21 The
debt had to be absolutely owing at the time of the petition in bankruptcy, whether then payable or not, and founded upon an express or
lO. See, e.g., In re George, 15 Bankr. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr.
434 (D. Utah 1980).
11. See cases cited supra note 10.
12. Nitz v. Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977); Goggans v. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186 (9th
Cir. 1956); In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928); In re Loeber, 12 Bankr. 669
(D.N.J. 1981); see also 9A AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 801 (1981); Annot., 74
A.L.R.2d 758 (1960).
13. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8
(West 1968). See In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775, 778 (D.N.M. 1981).
14. See In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958); In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775
(D.N.M. 1981).
15. Courts take these factors into account when determining the amount of alimony.
See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
16. See In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
17.Id18. In re Taff, lO Bankr. 101 (D. Conn. 1981).
19. See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 35 (1976».
20. See id § 63 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1976».
21. Id
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implied contract. 22 Generally, courts followed the rule that alimony
and support payments were not provable claims, and thus a discharge
in bankruptcy did not affect the bankrupt's obligation to pay accrued or
future subsidies. 23
The courts relied primarily on two factors to determine that alimony, maintenance, and support obligations were nondischargeable.
First, courts looked to the strong public policy that underlied the common law duty of the husband to support the wife and child. 24 Second,
because such responsibilities were not considered debts, they were not
deemed to be provable. 25 For example, in Audubon v. Shufeldt,26 the
issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the debtor
spouse was entitled to a discharge from the arrears of alimony due his
former wife. 27 The Court concluded that "neither the alimony in arrears at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy, nor alimony accruing since that adjudication were provable in bankruptcy, or barred by
the discharge."28 The Court further noted that: "Alimony does not
arise from any business transaction, but from the relation of marriage.
It is not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and
legal duty of the husband to support the wife."29
.
Similarly, in Wetmore v. Markoe,30 the Supreme Court held that
the bankrupt husband's obligation to pay alimony is based on his common law duty of support. 31 Consequently, the Court ruled that the liability of alimony is saved from discharge in bankruptcy.32 In reaching
its decision, the Court relied upon the reasoning of Audubon, 33 and
found that an alimony decree is not a debt, but rather a "legal means of
enforcing the obligation of the husband and father to support and
maintain his wife and children."34 Furthermore, the Court held that
this duty arises not from any contractual obligation, but from an obligation that the law automatically imposes upon the husband when he
neglects or refuses to voluntarily discharge this responsibility.35
22.1d.
23. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575
(1901); Turner v. Turner, 108 F. 785 (D. Ind. 1901); In re Shepard, 97 F. 187
(D.N.Y. 1899); In re Anderson, 97 F. 321 (D. N.Y. 1899). Con/ra In re Houston,
94 F. 119 (D. Ky. 1899); In re Van Orden, 96 F. 86 (D.N.J. 1899); In re Chalioner,
98 F. 82 (D. Ill. 1899); Arrington v. Arrington, 131 N.C. 143,42 S.E. 554 (1902).
24. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904); Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340
(1903); Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
25. See cases cited supra note 24.
26. 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
27. Id. at 576-77.
28. Id. at 580.
29. Id. at 577.
30. 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
31. Id. at 74.
32. Id. at 77.
33.1d. at 72-76.

34.1d.
35. Id. at 73-74.
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In 1903, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Act to include a provision that specifically excepted alimony, maintenance, and support payments from discharge in bankruptcy.36 Although merely declaratory of
the true meaning and sense of the original Act,37 the amendment was
passed with a view toward settling the law and putting to rest any controversies that arose from conflicting decisions in both state and federal
courtS. 38 Although the 1903 amendment made it clear that alimony,
maintenance, and support obligations were excepted from discharge in
bankruptcy, the courts were still faced with interpreting divorce decrees
and property settlement agreements to determine whether such obligations actually constituted alimony, support, or maintenance. 39 While
some federal courts simply accepted the state court's terminology as
indicative of alimony and property agreements,40 other courts maintained that the bankruptcy court is required to look to the substance of
the payment obligation in question and not to the labels imposed by
state law. 41
Schacter v. Schacter 42 and In re Waller 43 illustrate the different
approaches taken by courts under the 1898 Act to determine the nature
of the obligation in question. In Schacter, the husband contended that
since the payments required by the separation agreement44 did not
meet the technical requirements of alimony under Maryland law, the
debt constituted a property settlement and was therefore dischargeable.45 The court rejected the husband's argument and stated: "Pay36. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, § 17,32 Stat. 797 (codified as amended at II U.S.c.
§ 35(a)(7) (1976». The section states that Uta] discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts. . . except such as. . . (7) are for
alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife and child
. . . ." Id
37. See Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
38. Id at 76-77; see also Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
39. The problem arises because many state courts neglect to observe the alimonyproperty distinction in making financial provisions for the wife in the course of
divorce. Further, the parties themselves do the same thing in drafting separation
agreements in which alimony and property settlements are inextricably mingled
- the amount agreed upon as alimony being arrived at in consideration for the
amount to be transferred as property and vice versa. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 14.8 (West 1968).
40. See, e.g., Nitz v. Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977); Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d
304 (7th Cir. 1976); In re Waller, 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974); In re Alcorn, 162 F.
Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958). Cf. Brown v. Felson, 442 U.S. 127 (1979) (by the
express terms of the Constitution, bankruptcy law is federal law).
41. Schacter v. Schacter, 467 F. Supp. 64 (D. Md.), offd mem., 610 F.2d 813 (4th Cir.
1979); In re Usher, 442 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 1977); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434
(D. Utah 1980).
42. 467 F. Supp. 64 (D. Md.), offd mem., 610 F.2d 813 (4th Cir. 1979).
43. 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974).
44. The separation agreement provided in pertinent part that: "Husband shall pay to
Wife for her support and maintenance, until she dies or remarries, the sum of Two
Hundred Seventy-Five ($275.00) Dollars per month, beginning with the month of
August, 1961." 467 F. Supp. at 65.
45. Id at 66; see In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024 (5th Cir. 1975) (amount awarded to
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ments required by a contract for the support and maintenance of a wife
are not dischargeable in bankruptcy even though they do not constitute
payments for alimony under state law. . . and even though the separation agreement itself contains }!;rovisions concerning the settlement of
property rights of the parties." Thus, the Schacler court determined
that merely because the payments do not meet the technical requirements of alimony under state law does not automatically mean that the
payments are not intended for the wife's support. 47
Conversely, in In re Waller, 48 the agreement at issue was incorporated into a divorce decree and provided that the husband pay, indemnify, and hold the wife harmless from all existing obligations. 49 The
Sixth Circuit held that the obligation constituted support and, therefore, had not been discharged in the husband's bankruptcy proceeddebtor's spouse by divorce court, while not alimony under Texas law, constituted
support payments which fell within the exception to discharge).
46. 467 F. Supp. at 66; see In re Ridder, 79 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1935), cert. denied, 297
U.S. 721 (1936); In re Adams, 25 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1928).
47.467 F. Supp. at 66; see also Eigenbrode v. Eigenbrode, 19 Md. App. 597, 313 A.2d
569, cert. denied, 271 Md. 735 (1974) (a separation agreement which does not meet
aU the requirements for technical alimony is a "contractual agreement for support").
Although decided in 1981, the Fourth Circuit applied the law as it was prior
to the enactment of the 1978 Code in the case of Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300
(4th Cir. 1981) (applying Illinois law). In Melichar, the separation agreement,
which was executed in Illinois, provided that the husband pay the wife a lump
sum settlement in lieu of alimony, payable in monthly installments for 121
months. Id at 301. The agreement also provided that if the wife remarried, the
husband remained liable for the monthly installments for nine years. Id at 30102. Subsequently, the husband filed for bankruptcy in the District of Maryland
and sought to be discharged from further obligation under the agreement. Id at
302. The issue presented to the court was whether the husband's obligation to
make these payments to his former wife constituted a debt for alimony within the
meaning of section 17(a)(7) of the prior Act so as to except it from discharge upon
bankruptcy. Id The bankruptcy court held the debt to be alimony, and therefore
not dischargeable. 7 Bankr. at 966-68 (D. Md. 1980). The district court reversed
the bankruptcy court and ruled that the debt was not alimony, and was dischargeable. 661 F.2d at 302-03. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed and reinstated the judgment of the bankruptcy court. 661 F.2d at 303.
The court of appeals determined that the district court's most significant error was
its view that the intention of the parties to create alimony could only be proved by
showing that the payments qualified as alimony under state law. Id at 303. The
Fourth Circuit noted that classification of an agreement under state law is an important factor in determining intent, but went on to hold that:
[T]he agreement may be a hybrid of two means of paying alimony recognized by state law, and the fact that it combines features of both does
not automatically destroy the nature of the payment as alimony. The
proper test of whether the payments are alimony lies in proof of whether
it was the intention of the parties that the payments be for support rather
than as a property settlement.
Id at 303. See also Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1976); 3 COLLIER
ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15, at 523-11 (15th ed. 1983).
48. 494 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1974).
49. Id at 448.
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ings. 50 The court stated that "[t]he law of Ohio must be resorted to in
order to determine what constitutes alimony, maintenance, or support."51 Hence, the court determined that in light of the state statute,
history, and case law the husband's obligation constituted support and
was therefore nondischargeable. 52
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF
1978

In cases decided under the original Act, courts were confronted
with two conflicting policy considerations: requiring the bankrupt
spouse to fulfill obligations arising out of the broken marriage and giving the debtor a fresh start unencumbered by the burdens of pre-existing debts. 53 Courts applied varying state standards and definitions in
an effort to resolve this conflict, and consequently, federal case law evidenced varied and inconsistent results with regard to the dischargeability of maintenance and support obligations. 54 Congress
addressed this problem through the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 55
The Code effectuates several changes in the former law as it related to the nondischargeability of alimony, support, and maintenance. 56 For example, it is well established that no federal domestic
Id. at 451.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 448-51.
See In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (D. Minn. 1980); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D.
Utah 1980); Lee, Dischargeability of Debt: Alimony, Maintenance or Support, 5
AM. BANKR. L.J. 175 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Lee].
54. See In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (D. Minn. 1980).
55. See II U.S.c. § 523(a)(5)(Supp. V 1981). This section provides that:
(a) A discharge ... does not discharge an individual debtor from any
debt50.
51.
52.
53.

(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agreement,
but not to the extent that (A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of
law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section
402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or
support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support;
Id. The major purpose of the Bankruptcy Reform Act was the modernization of
bankruptcy law. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 304 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5787.
56. The Code abolished the concept of provability of debt contained in the original
Act. Under the Code, a "claim" is defined as any right to payment, whether or
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.
II U.S.C. § 101(4)(a) (Supp. V 1981). Further, a "claim" includes an equitable
right to performance that does not give rise to a right of payment. Id. § 101 (4)(b);
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relations law exists separate from state divorce law. 57 Accordingly, jurisdiction over such matters as marriage, divorce, child custody, alimony and child support remain in the state courts. 58 However, the
legislative history of the Code makes it clear that the intent of Congress
is to allow federal courts to determine whether characterizations of alimony or support made by state courts could meet the meaning of such
terms as they arise in the bankruptcy context.59 Hence, under section
523(a)(5) of the Code, federal bankruptcy law, not state law, is applied
to determine what constitutes alimony, support, or maintenance. 60 The
primary effect of this provision is to overrule those cases decided under
the original Act, which assumed that state law controlled the determination of the nature of these obligations.61 Some courts today continue
to examine state law despite the fact that the Code overruled those
cases, decided under the prior Act, relying upon state law to make their
determinations.62 For example, in In re Spong, 63 the court recognized
that determinations of alimony, maintenance, and support are made
under federal bankruptcy law rather than state law.64 Yet the court
also found that reference to the well established state law is not precluded by the Code. 65 In his dissenting opinion, Judge Lombard noted

57.

58.

59.

60.
61.
62.

63.
64.

65.

see H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5887. The definition of claim permits the
broadest possible relief in a bankruptcy case and permits a complete settlement of
the affairs of a bankrupt debtor, a complete discharge, and a fresh start. Id; see
also 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.02 (15thed. 1983).
De La Roma V. De La Roma, 201 U.S. 303 (1906); accord In re Dirks, 15 Bankr.
775 (D.N.M. 1981);In re Bishop, 13 Bankr. 304 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);In re Hughes, 16
Bankr. 90 (N.D. Ala. 1980). However, some courts have said that section 523
(a)(5) is an attempt by Congress to establish a new federal standard by which to
determine the dischargeability of a debt. See In re Daviau, 10 Bankr. 201 (D.
Mass. 1981); Williams V. Gurley, 3 Bankr. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
See In re Dirks, 15 Bankr 775 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Bishop, 13 Bankr. 304
(E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Hughes, 16 Bankr. 90 (N.D. Ala. 1980). "Federal bankruptcy law is not the source of these obligations, it takes them as it finds them and,
when necessary, characterizes the legal relations existing between the parties for
its own purposes." In re Albin, 541 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1979).
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6320; S. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865; see also In re Dirks,
15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981).
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6320; S. REp. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79 (1977),
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5787, 5865.
See In re Newman, 15 Bankr. 67 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
See In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981) (nothing in the legislative history suggests that state law plays no part in making the determination); In re Lineberry, 9
Bankr. 700 (W.D. Mo. 1981) (same); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
(same).
661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
Id at 9. The court noted that the husband has an "unescapable duty," both at
common law and by statute, to support his wife by providing her with the necessaries of life according to her station. Id
Id
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that bankruptcy law is uniform and state law is diverse, and that "when
Congress directs [the courts] to determine a matter under bankruptcy
law, recourse to state law seems inappropriate."66 Although other
courts proffer the same reasoning as Judge Lombard,67 it appears that
most courts refer to state law to aid in the determination of the nature
of a divorce decree. 68
One of the more significant clarifications under the Code is the
provision that excepts from discharge those debts that provide "maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement
agreement. ... "69 A plain reading of section 523(a)(5) indicates that
contracted liabilities for goods, medical attention, or board, supplied by
a spouse for the use and benefit of the ex-spouse or child, may not fall
within the exception to discharge if it is not specifically provided for
within the agreement or decree. 7o Courts that construed section
17(a)(7) of the original Act had expressed doubt as to whether a property settlement could ever be characterized as alimony.71 Under the
Code, section 523(a)(5) directs courts to initially determine whether the
purpose of the agreement is to provide maintenance for, or support of,
both spouse and child.72 If the proper purpose is found, such obliga66. Id at 11-12 (Lombard, J., dissenting).
67. See, e.g., In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Newman, 15 Bankr. 67
(M.D. Fla. 1981).
68. See, e.g., In re Moyer, 13 Bankr. 436 (W.O. Mo. 1981); In re Rank, 12 Bankr. 418
(D. Kan. 1981); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Allen, 4 Bankr.
617 (E.D. Tenn. 1980).
69. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. V 1981) (emphasis added); see 124 CONGo REC.
HII096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONGo REc.
S17406 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DeConcini); see also In re Leach,
15 Bankr. 1005 (D. Conn. 1981); In re Graham, 14 Bankr. 246 (W.O. Ky. 1981).
See generally, 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15[2], at 523-109 (15th ed.
1983).
70. See, e.g., In re Ostrander, 139 F. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1905); see also 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15[2], at 523-111 (15th ed. 1983).
71. See, e.g., Goggans V. Osborn, 237 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1956); In re Adams, 25 F.2d
640 (2d Cir. 1928); In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
72. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15[3], at 523-111 to-l13 (15th ed. 1983).
The Code also makes some minor changes in the law. The Code explicitly provides that the designation of a debt as alimony, maintenance, or support will not
bring it within the terms of the section unless the liability is actually in the nature
of alimony, support, or maintenance. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(5)(B) (Supp. V 1981).
This is considered a minor change because under the original Act most courts
implicitly looked to the substance of an agreement rather than the label that was
placed on a particular obligation. See In re Usher, 442 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga.
1977); In re Thompson, 13 Bankr. 830 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Newman, 15
Bankr. 67 (M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980). In addition section 523(a)(5) is more precise than the former section 35(a)(7) in that it
substitutes the word "spouse" for "wife" and thus excepts from discharge alimony, support, or maintenance due to a husband from a debtor-wife. This was
not a significant change either, since under the original Act most courts extended
the coverage of the section to husbands. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(5)(Supp. V 1981). See
Stephens V. Stephens, 465 F. Supp. 145 (W.O. Va. 1979); In re Crist, 460 F. Supp.
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tions are deemed nondischargeable, even if they are in terms of a property settlement.
A.

Tests to Determine Whether an Obligation is Dischargeable

It was originally thought that upon the Code's enactment, many of
the inconsistencies that existed in bankruptcy decisions would be resolved. However, one of the most difficult problems federal courts encounter remains in distinguishing a contract for the division of property
from a contract for maintenance and support. 73 Since there is no federal definition of alimony, maintenance, or support courts must look to
state law where definitions of these words continue to be couched in
broad terms, instead of in such a way as to be "sufficiently narrow in
scope so as to minimize infringement of this exception to discharge on
the objective of assuring the bankrupt a fresh start."74 As a result,
courts retain the same rationale they applied prior to the Code's enactment and the bankrupt spouse does not always receive a fresh start free
from existing obligations.
Courts employ different tests in an attempt to determine the nature
and dischargeability of an obligation. The intent test is most commonly applied by the courtS. 75 If the parties expressly intend for the
debt assumption to constitute alimony, maintenance, or support, the
court will uphold that express intent.76 When an agreement or decree
is unambiguous, its purpose is determined by an analysis of the "four
comers" of the instrument. 77 However, when the contract is ambiguous, the court will examine all the surrounding facts and circumstances
of the case to determine the aim of the parties when the instrument was
drawn. 78 Since the effect of filing for bankruptcy is usually not contemplated by the parties when an agreement is drafted, a court will not

73.
74.

75.

76.
77.
78.

891 (N.D. Ga. 1978). But see In re Wasserman, 3 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 467
(D.R.!. 1977) (section 35(a)(7) was unconstitutional because it provided nondischargeability only for debts owing to the wife). See generally 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ~ 523.15 (15th ed. 1983).
See In re Alcorn, 162 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Cal. 1958); 1 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY
LAW AND PRACTICE § 27.36 (1981); Swann, Dischargeability of Domestic Obligations in Bankruptcy, 43 TENN. L. REV. 231, 232 (1976).
Lee, supra note 53, at 178. The thrust of the Code is directed at rehabilitating the
debtor and allowing him a fresh start. In re Brace, 13 Bankr. 551 (N.D. Ohio
1981). See also In re Hughes, 16 Bankr. 90, 92 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (the main problem
in interpreting section 523(a)(5) comes with defining the words alimony, support,
and maintenance); In re Bishop, 13 Bankr. 304, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (the Code
fails to establish a specific standard for determining when a claim qualifies as
alimony, support, or maintenance).
See, e.g., Melichar v. Ost, 661 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1981) (decided under the 1898
Act); Schacter v. Schacter, 476 F. Supp. 64 (D. Md.), aJl'd mem., 610 F.2d 813 (4th
Cir. 1979).
See cases cited supra note 74.
In re Usher, 442 F. Supp. 866 (N.D. Ga. 1977); In re Norman, 13 Bankr. 894
(W.D. Mo. 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980).
See cases cited supra note 77.
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consider the agreement itself as evidence of their intent. 79
The second test the courts apply to resolve the nature of an obligation is the necessaries test. 80 Necessaries include such items as housing,
furniture, and food. 81 If these debts are included in the agreement,
payment of them is held to constitute nondischargeable support. 82
In addition to the tests and factors derived from case law, other
courts interpret section 523(a)(5) as providing a two-fold test to determine the dischargeability of an obligation. First, pursuant to section
523(a)(5)(A), in order to be held nondischargeable the payment must
be made directly to a spouse or dependent and must not have been
assigned to another entity voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise. 83 Second, the obligation must actually constitute alimony, maintenance, or s':j'port or the debt will be held dischargeable under section
523(a)(5)(B).
.
, When the above tests are inadequate a court will explore several
factors to further aid in its analysis of relevant obligations. Besides
looking to the state's statutory definition of support,8S a court will scrutinize the parties' relative incomes to determine if the debt assumption
was meant to balance a wide disparity in income. 86 If such disparity is
shown, the debt assumption is found to be in the nature of support. 87
Similarly, if the obligation is revocable upon the dependent spouse's
death or remarriage,88 or the spouse would be inadequately supported
upon discharge of the debts,8 the obligation will be considered alimony.90 Nevertheless, courts may hold that even if a debt was originally imposed on the basis of the need of the spouse or children the
debt can be discharged unless, at the time of filing for bankruptcy,
there exists a present need by the spouse or children that the debt be
79. See In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434, 441 (D. Utah 1980).
80. See In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Miller, 8 Bankr. 174, 176-77
(N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Henry, 5 Bankr. 342 (M.D. Fla. 1980); accord Poolman v.
Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961); In re Baldwin, 250 F. Supp. 533, 534 (D.
Neb. 1966).
81. In re Uhock, 15 Bankr. 695 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
82. See cases cited supra note 80.
83. See In re LaFleur, 11 Bankr. 26 (D. Mass. 1981); In re Drumheller, 13 Bankr. 707
(W.D. Ky. 1981).
84. See cases cited supra note 83.
85. See In re Jensen, 17 Bankr. 537 (W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775
(D.N.M. 1981); In re Lineberry, 9 Bankr. 700 (W.D. Mo. 1981). See, e.g., MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05 (1981) (factors used by the court in
determining property division/monetary awards in divorce cases).
86. See In re Woods, 561 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (D.
Minn. 1980); In re Diers, 7 Bankr. 18 (S.D. Ohio 1980).
87. See cases cited supra note 86.
88. See In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101 (D. Conn. 1981); In re Travis, [1978-1981 Transfer
Binder) BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) ~ 67,520 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. June 2, 1980).
89. See Nitz v. Nitz, 568 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Breaux, 8 Bankr. 218 (W.D.
La. 1981).
90. See In re Taff, 10 Bankr. 101 (D. Conn. 1981); In re Breaux, 8 Bankr. 218 (W.D.
La. 1981).
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paid.91 Other factors the court will look to are whether the payments
are made in one lump sum or terminate upon some condition. 92 Additional considerations are whether there are children involved;93 the
length of the marriage;94 the relative earning powers of the parties;95
the location of the provision in the agreement or decree;96 and the
parties' neRotiations and understanding of the provisions of the
agreement. 9
Although all these considerations are important in a court's analysis, different jurisdictions assign varying weights to each factor. Furthermore, because the facts of a case control its outcome, any "test"
strictly enunciated by a court in one case might be liberally construed
in the next. 98 Generally, courts take account of all relevant factors and
employ a balancing approach to weigh the requirement that the debtor
fulfill his marital obligations against that of giving the debtor a fresh
start. 99

B.

Case Examples

A general review of recent cases decided under the Code evidences
that courts are not deciding cases much differently then they had under
the 1898 Act. The Code is considered to be much narrower in scope
than the original Act; 100 however, it has been construed broadly by
many courts. Case law demonstrates that courts still appear to favor
the findings of maintenance and support when the rights and responsibilities of family relationships are involved. Consequently, the Code's
policy of giving the debtor a fresh start is rendered less significant. The
91. In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434, 442 (D. Utah 1980). The Warner court found that
such a determination was necessary to enforce the general purpose of the bankruptcy laws in providing relief for the debtor. Id.; accord In re Miller, 17 Bankr.
717 (W.D. Wis. 1982); In re Bradley, 17 Bankr. 107 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); In re
Nelson, 16 Bankr. 658 (M.D. Tenn 1981). But see In re Jensen, 17 Bankr. 537
(W.D. Mo. 1982) (the plaintiffs current need is an irrelevant consideration; the
determination must be based upon the intended function of the award "at the time
of entry of the state court dissolution decree").
92. In re Snyder, 7 Bankr. 147 (W.D. Va. 1980).
93. In re Maitlen, 658 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1981).
94. In re Cartner, 9 Bankr. 543 (M.D. Ala. 1981).
95. In re Maitlen, 658 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Fox, 5 Bankr. 317 (N.D. Tex.
1980).
96. In re Maitlen, 658 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1981).
97. In re Lineberry, 9 Bankr. 700 (W.D. Mo. 1981).
98. In re Thompson, 13 Bankr. 830 (W.D. Ky 1981). Compare In re Beckwith, 17
Bankr. 816 (N.D. Ohio 1982) (mortgage obligations dischargeable) and In re
Mineer, 11 Bankr. 663 (D. Cal. 1981) (same) with In re Ferrandino, 14 Bankr. 196
(D. Nev. 1981) (mortgage obligations nondischargeable) and In re Mullins, 14
Bankr. 771 (W.D. Okla. 1981) (same).
99. See, e.g., In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Newman, 15 Bankr. 67
(M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980).
100. See In re French, 9 Bankr. 464, 466 (S.D. Cal. 1981); In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348,
350-51 (D. Minn. 1980).
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following cases illustrate the various approaches courts have taken in
determining the nature of a bankrupt's obligations.
In In re Miller, 101 the terms of the separation agreement provided
that the husband pay the second mortgage on the house, or in the alternative, pay the wife the monthly payments should she dispose of the
property.102 The wife sold the property and paid off the second mortgage.103 The husband made no payments to the wife, and the wife
claimed she was due $4,000 pursuant to the separation agreement.
The court found the husband's debt to be in the nature of support
and maintenance for the wife and child, and therefore nondischargeable. 104 The court based its decision on earlier cases which held that
debts associated with support and maintenance are nondischargeable
when the payments are made upon the mortgage for a home that provides shelter for the beneficiaries. lOS The court looked to the wife's unemployment, the wife's custody of the minor child,l06 and the
husband's monthly payments that enabled the wife to obtain and maintain suitable housing for herself and her child.107 In reaching the conclusion that the debt in question was nondischargeable, the court
decided that the husband's marital obligations outweighed his right to
a fresh start. 108
In contrast, in In re Frey, 109 the bankruptcy court held that the
husband's obligation under a property settlement was dischargeable
when he was required to pay one-half of the mortgage payments on a
mobile home occupied by the wife. 110 In making its determination, the
court looked to Indiana statutory law for the circumstances giving rise
to an order for alimony, support, or maintenance. III The court found
the obligation to be in the nature of a property settlement, since the
wife never specifically asked for, nor did the divorce court order payment of, alimony, support, or maintenance in the divorce proceeding.112 Thus, the court concluded that the agreement in question
appeared to be made in consideration of the fact that the home was
purchased as a marital asset by both parties, and it allowed the parties
to keep the mortgage payments current in an equitable manner until
the house could be sold. 113
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.

17 Bankr. 773 (N.D. Ohio 1982).
Id. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 776.
Id. at 775; see Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1961); In re Massimini, 8 Bankr. 428 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
17. Bankr. at 776.
Id.
Id.
13 Bankr. 12 (S.D. Ind. 1981).
Id. at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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In In re George, 114 the court held that joint debts assumed by the
husband pursuant to a separation agreement were dischargeable in
bankruptcy. The separation agreement in this case contained a clause
that stated that the assumption of the joint debts constituted alimony,
and as such, "shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy."l1s Nevertheless, the court found such a waiver of rights to conflict with the purposes of the Code. 116 Therefore, the court held that the clause would
only be enforceable if the debts were actually in the nature of alimony,
support, or maintenance. 111 The court looked to the substance of the
agreement and found the clause was a division of property and thus
was dischargeable. I 18
The issue in both Miller and Frey was whether mortgage payments
by the debtor were in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support.
In Miller, the court weighed various factors in determining that the
debt constituted support and was therefore nondischargeable. In Frey,
the court found the debt to be dischargeable based upon state statutory
law. In George, the court looked to the substance of the agreement and
determined that joint debts owed by the debtor represented a property
division and were dischargeable.
In re Newman 119 evidences that recourse to state law is not necessary to determine the nature of an obligation. In Newman, the bankruptcy court decided that the question of whether an obligation
constitutes alimony, support, or maintenance should be determined
under federal bankruptcy law. 120 The court looked to the substance of
the agreement and determined that the husband's obligation under the
property settlement to preserve the marital home by paying attendant
expenses was in the nature of support, and therefore nondischargeable. 121 The factors the court held to be determinative in this case were
whether the obligation terminated upon death or remarriage, whether
the payment appeared to balance disparate incomes, whether it was
payable in installments over a substantial period of time, and whether
114. 15 BanIa. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
115. Id at 248.
116. Id at 249.
117.Id
118. Id The debts in question were owed to several creditors including Beneficial Finance Co., Visa. and the O'Neil Co. Id at 248.
119. 15 BanIa. 67 (M.D. Fla. 1981).
120. Id at 69.
121. Id at 69-70. The court quoted Poolman v. Poolman, 289 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir.
1961):
It is safe to say that the obligation to maintain and support a family
includes the obligation to keep a roof over their heads. It is obvious that
this is what the bankrupt undertook to do when he agreed to keep up the
installment payments on the trust deed upon the home in which his divorced wife and children were to live. That the obligation has become
unduly burdensome cannot be considered in determining the legal effect
of his discharge.
15 BanIa. at 70.
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minor children were involved. 122
Other courts follow the Newman decision and determine the nature of an obligation without any reference to state law. 123 These
courts use the various tests established to determine whether a debt is
dischargeable, and consider similar factors to those previously enumerated. 124 It is these courts that appear to be in accord with the legislative
history of the Code when they maintain that federal law is controlling.
C

Third Party Debts

When the Code was first enacted, commentators were unsure how
the courts would treat joint debts owed to third parties. 125 A literal
reading of section 523(a)(5), which applies to "a spouse, former spouse,
or child of the debtor," appears to allow debts owed to third parties to
be discharged. 126 It is reported in the legislative history that only support owed directly to a spouse or dependent is nondischargeable under
the Code. 127 However, the legislative history also provides that if the
debtor undertakes to hold the spouse harmless from debts to third parties, and if the obligation is in the nature of alimony, support, or maintenance, the debt is nondischargeable. 128 Consequently, courts take
different approaches and reach different conclusions when confronted
with the issue of whether a debt owed to a third party is excepted from
discharge in bankruptcy. Section 523(a)(5)(A) provides that debts
found to be alimony, maintenance, or support are dischargeable if assigned to another entity.129 A minority of jurisdictions expand section
523(a)(5)(A) to hold that debts payable to third parties are always dis122. 15 Bankr. at 69-70.
123. See, e.g., In re Huggins, 12 Bankr. 850 (D. Kan. 1981); see also supra notes 75-99
and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 75-99 and accompanying text; see also In re Petoske, 16 Bankr.
412 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Cf. In re Fontaine, 14 BanIa. 11 (D.R.I. 1981); In re
Stachowiak, 16 Bankr. 392 (D. Nev. 1982).
125. See 1 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 27.37-.41 (1981). COWANS,
BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.6 (interim ed. 1980). See generally Shiffer,
The New Bankruptcy Reform Act: It's Implications for Family Law Practitioners,
19 J. FAM. L. 1,20-26 (1981); Note, Dissolution of Marriage and the Bankruptcy
Act of 1973: "Fresh Start" Forgollen, 52 IND. L.J. 469, 480-83 (1977).
126. See In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981); In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (D.
Minn. 1980); H.R. REp. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 363 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5963, 6320. See generally 1 NORTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 27.37 (1981).
127. See 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5865, 6320, 6454,6522.
128. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo
& AD. NEWS 5963, 6320; see also COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 6.6 (interim ed. 1980).
129. 11 U.S.c. § 523(a)(5)(A) (Supp. V 1981). This section was amended by Pub. L.
No. 97-35, § 2334(b), 95 Stat. 863 (1981), effective August 13, 1981. The amendment added "other than debt assignments pursuant to § 402(a)(26) of the Social
Security Act." Id
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chargeable. 130 However, .most courts severely limit the scope of this
section and maintain that it pertains only to assignments to state welfare agencies and similar entities. 13l
Irrespective of the Code's provisions and the legislative history,
numerous decisions apply the same rationale to both third party debts
and to debts owed to a wife and child. 132 If a court finds a debt to be in
the nature of alimony, support, or maintenance, it will be held nondischargeable. 133 For example, in In re French, 134 the court construed the
legislative history of section 523(a)(5) as creating a nondischargeable
obligation even though a debt is owed to a third party.135 The French
Court, as well as other COUrts,136 decided that it is the substance of the
obligation, not the manner of payment, that will determine its
dischargeability.
Similarly, in Stranathan v. Stowell, 137 the issue before the bankruptcy court was whether amounts payable to third parties, on debts for
which spouses are jointly liable, can be held nondischargeable as alimony, maintenance, or support. 138 The court noted that "[p]ayments to
a third party for joint debts which release the nonpaying spouse from
the financial obligation are actually indirect payments to the
spouse."139 Hence, as long as the required payments are determined to
be alimony, maintenance, or support, and not a property settlement or
division of debts, the payments can be held to be nondischargeable
under section 523(a)(5) of the Code. 14O Likewise, in In re Growney, 141
the court held that the payment of medical and dental bills, although
owed to third parties, constitutes support and therefore are nondis130. See In re Crawford, 8 Bankr. 552 (D. Kan. 1981); In re Allen, 4 Bankr. 617 (E.D.
Tenn. 1981); In re Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981).
131. See In re French, 9 Bankr. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re Wells, 8 Bankr. 189 (N.D.
Ill. 1981);In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind. 1980). One court noted that the test
of whether a debt has been assigned under section 523(a)(5)(A) is whether or not
the nonpaying spouse will receive any present benefit from the payment of the
debt. Stranathan v. Stowell, 15 Bankr. 223 (D. Neb. 1981).
132. See, e.g., In re French, 9 Bankr. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434
(D. Utah 1980); In re Henry, 5 Bankr. 342 (M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Williams, 3
Bankr. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1980); In re
Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D; Ind. 1980).
133. See In re French, 9 Bankr. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1981); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404
(N.D. Ill. 1980); In re Henry, 5 Bankr. 342 (M.D. Fla. 1980); In re Warner, 5
Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980); In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind. 1980).
134. 9 Bankr. 464 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
135.Id at 466-67.
136. See In re Warner, 5 Bankr. 434 (D. Utah 1980); In re Henry, 5 Bankr. 342 (M.D.
Fla. 1980); In re Williams, 3 Bankr. 401 (N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr.
404 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
137. 15 Bankr. 223 (D. Neb. 1981).
138. Id at 225.
139. Id at 225-26.
140. Id
141. 15 Bankr. 849 (W.D.N.Y. 1981).
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chargeable. 142 The court reasoned that "if the debtor fail[ed] to satisfy
his obligations to the medical claimants, the debtor 'at the same time,
fails to satisfy his obligation to his wife [and children].' "143
In re Daiker 144 and In re Dirks 14S are examples of cases which
have held debts to third parties to be dischargeable. In Daiker, the
court determined that under the Code it must first decide if a debt is
payable directly to the spouse. If the debt is paid to a third person, the
court held that it is dischargeable regardless of the characterization of
the debt as alimony, support, or maintenance. l46 Thus, the court ruled
that the husband's obligation under the divorce decree to pay certain
household debts to third parties was dischargeable as a matter of
law. 147 In addition, the court emphasized the fact that the debts were
joint obligations incurred incident to the marriage relationship. 148
The divorce decree in Daiker also provided that the husband was
to "hold harmless and indemnify" the wife in the event a creditor pursued the ex-wife on any debts.149 The wife argued that this obligation
constituted maintenance and support and was therefore nondischargeable. ISO The court addressed the wife's contention and recognized that
a hold harmless agreement could be an obligation subject to the nondischargeable provisions of section 523(a)(5).lsl However, the court
maintained that such a determination must be made ''within the framework of federal law and must be consistent with the fresh start goal of
the Bankruptcy Act."IS2 The court concluded that the hold harmless
agreement was not in the nature of maintenance or support, since the
wife waived any right to maintenance in the decree and there was no
indication that the provision was intended to balance the relative income of the parties. IS3 Of obvious paramount concern to the Daiker
court was that the debtor be released from all obligations to be able to
begin a fresh start. IS4 The court stated:
It is only in those cases when it is clearly discernible that the
142. Id. at 850 (citing In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981». The court so found even
though the debts were paid directly to third parties.
143. 15 Bankr. at 850.
144. 5 Bankr. 348 (D. Minn. 1980).
145. 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981).
146. 5 Bankr. at 351. The court relied upon the legislative history of the code in interpreting the provision. Id. at 351 n.2.
147. Id. at 352. The court noted that it would be contrary to its primary goal to provide relief to the debtor if it was to accede to the state court's interest in the division of marital assets and obligations, maintenance, and support, and to deny the
debtor his fresh start simply because his former wife chose not to seek the same
relief on her own behalf. I d.
148.Id. at 351.
149.1d.
150. Id. at 352.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 351.
153. Id. at 352-53.
154. Id. at 352.
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divorce court intended to award support or maintenance to
sEouse or child that this court should set aside the policy of
'fresh start" in the Bankruptcy Code in favor of the state
court's judgment of necessity and need for spouse and
child. 155
A similar view was expressed in In re Dirks. 156 The Dirks court
also recognized that the major policy concern under the Code is to give
the debtor a fresh start. 157 Since the exceptions to discharge vitiate this
fresh start, the court held that they must be interpreted narrowly, 158
and found that under section S23(a)(S)(A) a debt payable to a third
party is dischargeable. 159 The court noted that "[c]ourts which allow
creditors to take advantage of this exception under the guise of alimony
contravene the fresh start policy as well as widen the supposedly narrow exceptions to dischargeability."16o The court then proceeded to extensively discuss and interpret the sections of the Code relative to third
party debts and assignments.
First, the court ruled that since obligations in the nature of alimony terminate upon death or remarriage of the spouse, finding a debt
to a third party nondischargeable does not comport with the intention
to award support, since a third party creditor can enforce collection of
debts regardless of the future circumstances of the ex-wife. 161 Thus, the
court reasoned that in order to accomplish the pu~ose of section
523(a)(S), such a debt to a third party is dischargeable. 1 2 However, the
ISS. Id
156. 15 Bankr. 775 (D.N.M. 1981). The wife sought to have the court declare that
certain debts ordered to be paid by the debtor in a prior divorce proceeding were
nondischargeable. The divorce decree provided in pertinent part:
Petitioner . . . is ordered to assume and pay as his sole and separate
obligation the following community debts:
(a) The indebtedness to Rio Grande Valley Bank. . .
(b) The indebtedness to Cessna Aircraft ...
(c) The indebtedness to First National Bank ...
(d) The indebtedness to Harold Dirks .. .
(e) The indebtedness to Frank Skarritt .. .
(f) The indebtedness to Master Charge . . .
(g) The indebtedness to VISA . . . .
Id at 776-77.
157. Id at 779.
158. Id
159. Id The court reasoned that such a debt is in fact assigned to, and thus payable to,
another entity. Id
160. Id The court believed that the purpose of the section S23(a)(5) exception is to
protect spouses and children, not creditors. Id
161. Id at 780. Not discharging third party debts totally defeats the policy of fresh
start since creditors are the very parties against whom the debtor is given protection. Id at 779. But if. In re Duckson, 13 Bankr. 373 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (creditor
does not have standing to object to debtor's discharge).
162. IS Bankr. at 780. But see In re Bell,S Bankr. 653 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (finding
payments made to third parties in lieu of alimony nondischargeable); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (same); In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind.
1980) (same).
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court did express concern for the ex-spouse and noted that she could
file a proceeding in bankruptcy court for a determination of whether
the palment to the third party was intended to be alimony or support. 16 The bankruptcy court could then order the payment of alimony to the spouse in an amount measured by the payment to the third
party creditor. 164
Second, the court interpreted section 523(a)(5)(A) to apply to more
than technical assignments. 165 The court held that this section should
be read as a whole unit with each part accorded no greater weight than
any other part. 166 Subsection A provides that a debt which is "assigned
to another entity voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise" is dischargeable. 167 Subsection B provides that a debt is dischargeable "unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or
support." 168 Thus, the court concluded that jurisdictions which find
debts to third parties nondischargeable on the grounds that the payments are meant to be alimony in effect read subsection B to the total
exclusion of subsection A.169
IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND PLANNING TIPS

A.

Recommendations
A plain reading of section 523(a)(5) evidences Congress' intent for
the judiciary to balance the right of a person to begin fresh after he has
filed for bankruptcy against that person's obligations to his family in
determining the dischargeability of a marital debt. Many courts defeat
the policy of fresh start and disallow the discharge of third party debts.
In addition, courts still rely on state law rather than federal bankruptcy
law to determine whether an obligation is in the nature of alimony,
support, or maintenance, or whether it is a property settlement.
Unfortunately, the result is that courts apply the same rationale
today as they did under the 1898 Act. Thus, it is apparent that the
enactment of section 523(a)(5) did not bring about all of the intended
results. A possible solution is for Congress to amend the Code to make
163. 15 Bankr. at 780.
164. Id
165. Id The court reasoned that since Congress inserted the words "or otherwise" in
section 523(a)(5), these words are intended to broaden the scope of the meaning of
assignment to include more than just technical assignments. Id Thus, the Dirks
court rejected cases holding that section 523(a)(5)(A) does not apply to assignments which are informal. 15 Bankr. at 781; see, e.g., In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6 (2d
Cir. 1981);In re Rank, 12 Bankr. 418 (D. Kan. 1981). Further, the court criticized
those cases which limited the scope of the section to welfare agencies, 'since the
term "entity" as defined in II U.S.C. § 101 (14) (Supp. V 1981) includes more
than just welfare agencies. 15 Bankr. at 781. See, e.g., In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404
(N.D. lli. 1980); In re Knabe, 8 Bankr. 53 (S.D. Ind. 1980).
166. 15 Bankr. at 781.
167. See II U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A)(Supp. V 1981).
168. Id § 523(a)(5)(B).
169. 15 Bankr. at 781.
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section 523(a)(5) more specific with regard to what types of debts are
dischargeable. This appears to be a feasible solution since Congress
has done this with other sections of the Code. For example, in section
522 Congress has set forth ~ecific exemptions to which the debtor is
entitled under federal law. 17 The purpose of the exemption section is
the same as that of section 523(a)(5}-it is for the benefit of the debtor's
family, who may be destitute, and for the benefit of the public, who
might otherwise be burdened with support of an insolvent debtor's
family. 171 Debts which should be addressed are attorney's fees, medical expenses for children, mortgage payments, debts for household
items and automobiles, and debts incurred through general hold harmless agreements. The Code should also be amended to include narrow
definitions of the terms "alimony," "maintenance," and "support," for
the purpose of federal bankruptcy law.
However, since no bills are currently on the floor in Congress, it
does not appear likely that this section of the Code will be amended in
the near future. Consequently, courts could begin to narrowly interpret
the exceptions to discharge and thereby preserve the Bankruptcy
Code's underlying policy of giving a debtor a fresh start.
B.

Planning Tips

Although the goal of the Bankruptcy Code is to allow the debtor a
fresh start free from pre-existing obligations, it is clear that the law
favors family support obligations. In drafting a property settlement
agreement or divorce decree, the attorney must make certain that the
actual intent of the parties is clear. Further, the agreement should be
drafted so that it clearly distinguishes alimony and support obligations
from property settlements.
If the parties have a great number of debts from the marriage, the
attorney should consider the feasibility of both parties filing for bankruptcy before the divorce is final. The Code provides that two qualified
debtors or a qualified debtor and a spouse may file a joint bankruptcy
petition. 172 Under the Code, there is no requirement that the parties be
living together at the time of filing. 173 In order to insure compliance
with the procedural aspects of the Code, attorneys should also be aware
of the automatic stay provisions,174 removal provisions,175 and provisions relating to the powers of the trusteep6
170. See 11 u.s.c. § 522 (Supp. V 1981).
171. See In re Swartz, 18 Banlcr. 454 (D. Mass. 1982).
172. See 11 U.S.c. § 302(a) (Supp. V 1981).
173.ld
174. See 11 U.S.c. § 362 (Supp. V 1981).
175. See 28 U.S.c. § 1478(a) (Supp. V 1981).
176. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 541 (Supp. V 1981).
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V.

CONCLUSION
In enacting section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress attempted to ease the confusion surrounding the discharge ability
of marital obligations. A review of the case law decided under the
Code indicates that this attempt was only partially successful. Courts
are still faced with the difficult task of interpreting divorce decrees and
property settlement agreements in order to determine the nature of the
debtor's marital obligations under bankruptcy law. Since there is no
federal domestic relations law, courts must resort to state law in interpreting these agreements. Unfortunately, state law definitions of marital obligations differ, and at times appear to be in direct conflict with
the underlying policy of the Code. Consequently, attorneys should be
careful in drafting divorce decrees and settlement agreements, clearly
stating the intent of the parties. In addition, courts must narrowly interpret such agreements to accomodate the fresh start policy of the
Code.
Christina Marie Gattuso

